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ARKANSAS MODEL CONTRACT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
INTRODUCTION TO 1997 PRELIMINARY DRAFT
Arkansas practitioners have long suffered from the lack of any standard
set of jury instructions for contract cases, a resource that would be advanta-
geous for the profession and the public. First, there are peculiarities in our law
(e.g., the Tacit Agreement Rule) and in our procedures (e.g., election of
remedies) which make resorting to "national" standardized instructions
perilous. The Committee believes that parties familiar with our law should
formulate these instructions, if only to assure that they do not trespass our
constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence, as other states'
pattern instructions sometimes do.
Second, standardized instructions offer economies to the profession and
the public. Too many contract cases are "not worth instructing" because the
amount in controversy is relatively small, and the investment of time in
developing instructions for the specific case is relatively high. Actions at law
are time-consuming enough as it is, without having to spend an inordinate
amount of time developing a basic charge to the jury. If nothing else, the
Committee hopes that its labors will allow our colleagues in the bar, and the
learned judges of our bench, a respite from one of their more time-consuming
and disagreeable tasks.
Third, the Committee believes that a set of standardized instructions may
have the beneficial effect of introducing a greater rigor and predictability in the
law. For example, it is loosely said that a contract can be interpreted by
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reference to the parties' conduct and subsequent acts. But this is so only if the
contract is ambiguous, a qualifying condition that is often lost in the shuffle.
It is a question of law whether a contract is ambiguous.' Ultimately, it may be
improper even to consider evidence of subsequent acts, statements, and conduct
for purposes of interpretation, if the contract is otherwise clear, although such
evidence may be considered on questions of waiver or estoppel. If a defendant
learns that the issue of interpretation (on which the plaintiff would ordinarily
have the burden) is foreclosed to him, and that he must shoulder the burden of
proving waiver or estoppel or novation, then his relish for a jury fight may be
diminished. In other words, a fairly rigorous set of instructions can reduce
unnecessary contention in the law courts.
Last, these instructions are without partisan edges; they are free of the sly
adverbial clauses of the advocate's trick bag. The trial bench can use these
instructions with some confidence that none of the roils of the parties at bar
find expression here.
There is a design, however imperceptible, to the order and division of
these instructions. They proceed from a "decision tree" that is possible to
reconstruct. The Committee begins with Form A-1 expressing the elements of
a plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. The first element-valid con-
tract-may or may not be the subject of a legitimate contest. If it is, then the
jury is directed to ponder the elements of a valid contract, in Form A-2, and
is given definitions for offer, acceptance, and consideration in Forms A-3, A-4,
and A-5. Forms A-7 through A- 11 provide special instructions regarding
consideration and acceptance, rejection, and revocation of offers.
The parties may, on the other hand, agree that they entered into a valid
contract, but one of them may contest either that he breached it, or that the
contract means what his adversary says it does. Questions about interpretation
are handled in Section B and questions of performance or breach are taken up
in Section E. The defendant-obligor may admit the contract but believe that his
performance should be relieved for fraudulent inducement or duress. These
matters are taken up in Section C.
A thorny problem arises over questions of modification. Typically, X will
contract with Z to erect an addition to his home. The contract will contain
boilerplate that no modifications will be allowed unless signed by both parties.
X and Z will then decide to move a wall, resulting in additional cost to Z. X
will decide he does not need to pay for the change. This typical case is covered
by instructions on modification in Section D.




The Committee also included instructions on promissory estoppel (Form
A-12) and contracts implied in face (Form A-13) as well as damages (Section
G).
While the Committee attempted to provide a basic set of instructions on
key contract issues, it consciously avoided any treatment of issues raised by
special classes of contracts such as those relating to construction, employment
or the Uniform Commercial Code. Where appropriate, the proposed contract
instructions may serve in cases involving those types of contracts. However,
the Committee believes a comprehensive set of instructions for particular types
of contracts is best left to a future committee of practitioners in those areas.
The Committee expresses its deep gratitude to the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock Law Journal for its generous decision to publish these proposed
instructions as a service to the bar. Members of the bench and bar are
encouraged to review the proposed instructions and to submit comments and
suggestions concerning the instructions to William A. Waddell, Jr., Friday,
Eldredge & Clark, 2000 First Commercial Building, 400 West Capitol Avenue,
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201. Ultimately, a final revised draft of the proposed
instructions will be submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on
Jury Instructions-Civil for study and possible adoption.
2. The Committee was aware of cases such as Sellers v. West-Ark. Const. Co., 283 Ark.
341, 676 S.W.2d 726 (1984), which discuss the propriety of instructing the jury on the theory
of quasi-contract. However, the Committee elected not to propose a model instruction on this
theory of contract liability.
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To establish his claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the folowing elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
First, that the parties entered into a valid contract
that required the defendant to perform a certain act [or
refrain from performing a certain act]; and
Second, that the plaintiff did [or refrained from
doing] all or substantially all the acts that the contract
required of him; and
Third, that the defendant substantially failed to do
what the contract required him to do; and
Fourth, that as a result of the defendant's failure
to do what the contract required him to do, plaintiff
suffered damages for which the law gives compensation.
[If you find that the plaintiff has proved all of these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff. If,
however, plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of these propositions,
then your verdict must be for the defendant.]
COMMENT
The first question confronting the Committee was how many elements
an Arkansas plaintiff must prove. Arkansas case law indicates that damages
must be alleged and proved to sustain a claim for breach of contract. Nominal
damages may be recovered from breach of contract in the absence of actual
damages. 4 Statutory law provides for an award of attorney's fees to a party
who proves a breach of contract, recoverable as costs.5 To require a party to
prove actual damages, and put him at pains of paying large fees to the other
even where he has proved a contract and its breach, could be error. The
Committee's decision to include damages as a fourth element to the formula for
liability is a bow to the uncertainty presented by dicta in some Arkansas cases;'
to the practice of the other jurisdictions who have promulgated model
3. See Marks v. Powell, 162 B.R. 820 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993); Rabalaias v. Barnett, 284
Ark. 527, 683 S.W.2d 919 (1985) (concerning the adequacy of pleadings).
4. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Aubrey, 61 Ark. 613, 33 S.W. 1063 (1896).
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Michie 1994).
6. See Rabalaias, 284 Ark. 527, 683 S.W.2d 919.
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instructions;7 and, finally, to the practical realization that this problem will not
often present itself. To the extent that it does, the fourth element can be
deleted, and the final sentences of the instruction amended to state:
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all three of these
propositions by a preponderance of the evidence, then you
will determine from the evidence what damage the plain-
tiff has suffered. If, however, plaintiff has failed to prove
any one or more of these three propositions, then your
verdict must be for the defendant.
We have formulated the fourth element, damages, in a somewhat
circular fashion to exclude damages for mental suffering in a case where that
might be an area of concern for the jury.
The elements instruction is consciously referential. To find that the
parties entered a valid contract, the jury will be referred to Form A-2, and those
following and defining its terms. To determine whether the parties substan-
tially performed their duties, they are referred to Form E-4. To determine
whether the law gives compensation for the damages suffered by the plaintiff,
they are referred to instructions given in Part G: Damages.
The bracketed portion of the instruction should not be given when the




To establish that the parties entered into a valid contract, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the following elements by a preponder-
ance of the evidence:
(1) That one party made an "offer" to the other, which was
"accepted"; and
(2) That the offer and acceptance included an exchange of
"consideration"; and
(3) That the agreement, when it was made, was "reasonably
certain" in all its essential terms.
7. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 10.85 (2d ed. 1994); ILLINOIS




Under Arkansas case law, certain elements of a valid contract-
competent parties, subject matter, legal consideration, mutual agreement, and
mutual obligations-are matters of law for the court to decide Some of them,
such as capacity, are defenses.9 It is thought better to instruct on factual
elements like offer, acceptance, consideration, certainty, and completeness




An "offer" is a proposal to enter into an agreement. It is a promise
or a statement made by one party of what he will do or not do in return
for some promise or act by another. An offer occurs when one party
communicates to another a willingness to enter into an agreement with
that other party, and does so under circumstances that justify the other
party in concluding that a binding agreement will result if he accepts the
offer according to its terms.
COMMENT
Arkansas case law does not appear to provide a good definition of
"offer." The Committee has adapted a definition of "offer" from Montana
case law.
8. See Keith v. City of Cave Springs, 233 Ark. 363, 344 S.W.2d 591 (1961) (mutuality
of obligation); Bene v. New York Life Ins. Co., 191 Ark. 714, 87 S.W.2d 979 (1935) (subject
matter); Moss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 Ark. App. 33, 776 S.W.2d 831 (1989). Mutuality of
obligation is a common law saw that has been much dulled, and cases now simply ask whether
there is sufficient consideration for a contract. See Keith v. City of Cave Springs, 233 Ark. 363,
344 S.W.2d 591 (1961).
9. See Maddox v. Hamp Williams Hardware Co., 181 Ark. 403, 26 S.W.2d 85 (1930)
(holding that incapacity must be pleaded or the defense is waived).
10. See Sunburst Oil & Gas Co. v. Neville, 257 P. 1016 (Mont. 1927). The Committee
believes the instruction is more workable than the RESTATEMENT definition. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) defines "offer" as follows: "An offer is the manifestation
of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that






A party "accepts" another's offer to him when he, by words or
conduct, demonstrates his unconditional assent to the terms of the offer.
If a party has made an offer to another, and the other accepts condition-
ally, or introduces a new term into the bargain, then his response is not an
acceptance. Acceptance may reasonably be implied from words or
conduct, and must occur before the offer is withdrawn or lapses.
COMMENT
Arkansas case law does not afford a pithy, usable definition of
"acceptance," but the formulation chosen is in accord with Arkansas cases.I'
It should be noted, however, that an acceptance which recites additional terms




"Consideration" is a promise or a performance that is bargained-
for. A promise or performance is bargained-for if it is sought by one party
in exchange for his promise. Consideration can consist of a promise, an
act, or a promise not to do something that a party has a legal right to do.
It can consist of a benefit to the party making the promise to which he is
not already lawfully entitled, or any detriment to the other, that he was
not already lawfully bound to suffer.
11. See Tucker Duck & Rubber Co. v. Byram, 206 Ark. 828, 177 S.W.2d 759 (1944);
Webster Lumber Co. v Lincoln, 115 S. 498 (Fla. 1927). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 50(1) (1981), defines the term as follows: "Acceptance of an offer is a
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required
by the offer." This definition is too awkward for use in instructing a jury because of its use of
lawyerly and confusing phrases.




This instruction is drawn from Arkansas case law and the RESTATE-
MENT. 3 This instruction does not address the rare case in which the consider-




Contracts must be reasonably certain in each of their essential
terms. A contract is reasonably certain if it enables the parties to
understand the rights and obligations created by the contract. [If the terms
of a contract are vague, it can nevertheless be enforced if the actions of the
parties make the agreement a reasonably certain one].
COMMENT
Arkansas cases hold that a vague contract may be enforced if the
parties' actions can make it reasonably definite.' 5 The bracketed language may




An offer may be revoked at any time before it is accepted, by a
communication from the party who made the offer, received by the party
to whom the offer was made, or by a person authorized by that party to
13. See Bass v. Service Supply Co., 25 Ark. App. 273, 757 S.W.2d 189 (1988);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
14. See John Deere Co. v. Broomfield, 803 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Arkansas
law).
15. See Swafford v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 252 Ark. 1182, 483
S.W.2d 202 (1972) (reflecting a distaste for nullity).
16. This instruction is modeled, in part, after COLORADO MODEL JURY INsTRUCTION, CIVIL
§ 30.07 (Bancroft-Whitney, 3d ed. 1990). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2)
(1981), defines certainty in an elliptical fashion: "The terms of a contract are reasonably certain
if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy." See also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136 (1992). The
RESTATEMENT language is unsatisfactory because it leads to absurdity; if an agreement is
uncertain it cannot be a contract, so there is no need to determine a breach.
[Vol. 20
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receive it, or when it is deposited in some place which that party has
authorized for such communications to be deposited.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Arkansas case law as expanded by the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. 17 An offer is accepted if it is posted
"before any intimation is received that the offer is withdrawn."' 8  The
emphasized language is too open-ended, too unbounded by rule, to function in
a law court. It has evidently found its way into the law by the route of equity,
where a party has attempted to enforce a bad bargain against another in
circumstances where he knew the other intended to revoke his offer. It appears
more appropriate to equity, as where a party sues to enforce a contract he had
reason to believe was not intended, to which the defendant interposes an
equitable defense of mistake or accident.' 9 If, as we suppose, "intimations"
will be judged "communications" in courts of equity only, then it is inappropri-




If an offer is rejected, it may not thereafter be accepted by the
party to whom it was made. An offer is considered to be rejected if the
person to whom it was made proposes new terms or imposes conditions or
reservations not contained in the original offer. However, if an acceptance
only expresses terms, reservations, or conditions that were implied in the
original offer, it is not a rejection of the offer, but an acceptance, and both
parties are bound by the agreement, if it is otherwise certain, and
supported by consideration.
17. See Kempner v. Cohn, 47 Ark. 519, 1 S.W. 869 (1886); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 68 (1981).
18. Kempner, 47 Ark. at 525, 1 S.W. at 871 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, 2 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477 (Charles M. Barnes, ed., 13th ed. 1884)).
19. In 1869, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[t]o correct and relieve against
mistakes and accidents is one of the principal objects and most ordinary duties of courts of




This instruction is taken from Smith v. School District No. 89. If a
response proposes terms, conditions, and reservations, it becomes a counterof-




When an offer has been made, it will be deemed to be open for the
time specified in the offer, or for a reasonable time, and if not accepted
during that time, it will be considered rejected. If an offer has been made,
and an immediate acceptance is requested, or is to be expected by the
usages of the particular trade or business, then the making of the offer is
accompanied by the implied stipulation that the acceptance shall be
immediate.
COMMENT
See Kempner v. Cohn.2' Forms B-9, B-11, and B-12 might be used in
conjunction with this instruction.
A. CONTRACT FORMATION
FORM A-10
PAST ACT AS CONSIDERATION
An act done in the past cannot be consideration for a later
contract. An undertaking by a party to do something which he is already
obligated to do is not sufficient to constitute consideration, except where
the existence of the duty is the subject of an honest and reasonable dispute.
COMMENT
See United States v. Westmoreland Manganese Corp.22
20. See Byford v. Gates Bros. Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 400,225 S.W.2d 929 (1950); Smith
v. School Dist. No. 89, 187 Ark. 405, 59 S.W.2d 1022 (1933).
21. 47 Ark. 519, 1 S.W. 869 (1886).
22. 134 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1955).
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Generally, silence and inaction do not constitute acceptance but
imply rejection after lapse of reasonable time. A party who knowingly
accepts the benefits of a proposed contract, is bound by its terms.
COMMENT
Acceptance by silence may constitute acceptance only in special
circumstances.23 Silence where there is a duty to speak may create liabilities.2
In other unspecified but nevertheless special circumstances such as long-term
dealing and settled customs, silence may constitute acceptance of an offer.25
We believe this instruction correctly states the law on this point.
However, it may not be appropriate for use when the special circumstances
referred to above are present or when the instruction in Form A- 12 concerning




To establish his claim for promissory estoppel, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the following elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
First, that the defendant made a promise to the plaintiff;
and
Second, that the defendant should reasonably have
expected the plaintiff to act in reliance on the promise or to refrain
from acting in reliance on the promise; and
Third, that the plaintiff acted or refrained from acting in
reasonable reliance on the promise; and
Fourth, that the plaintiff suffered damage for which the
law gives compensation as a result of the reliance.
23. See Reliance Bagging Co. v. Electric Gin Co., 208 Ark. 829, 187 S.W.2d 724 (1945).
24. Camp v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 12 Ark. App. 150, 671 S.W.2d 213 (1984)
(confidential relationship).
25. See Reliance Bagging Co. v Electric Gin Co., 208 Ark. 829, 187 S.W.2d 724 (1945).
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COMMENT
The Committee submits this instruction in element format (as opposed




CONTRACT IMPLIED IN FACT
A contract may be either express or implied. A promise, either
express or inferred, is an essential element of both express and implied
contracts. A promise sufficient to form an implied contract may be
inferred from the acts of the parties or their general course of dealing. In
determining whether an implied contract was formed between the plaintiff
and the defendant, you are to consider the parties' conduct and course of
dealing from the viewpoint of a reasonable person, considering all of the
attendant circumstances.
COMMENT
The Committee designed this instruction to be used in cases in which
the facts are sufficient for the jury to decide whether there was a contract
implied in fact between the parties. 27 The instruction may be used in
conjunction with Form A-1. An issue unclear in Arkansas law (and left
undecided by the Committee) is how to instruct the jury on the other essential
elements of a contract.2 Montana concludes its model instruction on implied
contracts with this sentence: "The same elements are essential to an implied
contract as are essential to an express contract., 29 The Committee seeks
comments from the bar and bench as to whether a similar statement should be
included in the Arkansas instruction.
26. See Dickson v. Delhi Seed Co., 26 Ark. App. 83, 760 S.W.2d 382 (1988).
27. See Phillips v. Marist Soc'y of Wash. Province, 80 F.3d 274 (8th Cir. 1996).
28. Cf. Form A-2.
29. MONTANA PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, § 13.07 (Montana Supreme Court Commission






Parties to a contract are presumed to contract only for themselves.
However, a contract may be enforced by a person who is not a party to the
contract if the person demonstrates that the parties to the contract clearly
intended to benefit that person.
[If a person is not named in the contract but is otherwise sufficiently
described or designated or is a member of a class of persons sufficiently
described or designated, he may enforce the contract if he demonstrates that the
parties to the contract clearly intended to benefit him.]
COMMENT
This instruction states the general rule regarding third party beneficia-
ries.30 The bracketed portion should be used when the contract either does not
name the alleged third party beneficiary or when the beneficiary claims to be
a member of a benefitted class.
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-1
INTERPRETING CONTRACT TO GIVE EFFECT
TO INTENT OF THE PARTIES
It is your duty to interpret the contract in order to effectuate what
the parties intended when they made their agreement. You should
determine the parties' intent principally from the language of the contract.
If the contract is silent or unclear on a subject, you may then consider
other evidence of their intent. You should give the words of a contract
their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, unless it is clear that certain
words were intended to be used in a technical sense.
COMMENT
This instruction incorporates and combines the rules found in Arkansas
case law.31
30. See Little Rock Wastewater Util. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 321 Ark. 303, 902
S.W.2d 760 (1995).
31. See Conley Transp., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 312 Ark. 317, 849 S.W.2d 494 (1993);





WORDS OF ART AND TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY
You should interpret terms of art, or words associated with a
particular trade or occupation, as those words are used by experienced
and knowledgeable members of that trade or occupation, unless the
evidence discloses that the parties used the words in a different sense.
COMMENT
See Les-Bil, Inc. v. General Waterworks Corp.32
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-3
DETERMINATION OF PARTIES' INTENT
When the language of a contract is ambiguous, you should give
weight to the construction placed on the contract by the parties them-
selves, as shown by their conduct, subsequent statements, and acts.
COMMENT
See RAD-Razorback Ltd. Partnership v. B.G. Coney Co.;33 Wynn v.
Sklar & Phillips Oil Co.;3 Northwest National Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. ;35 Welch v. Cooper.
3 6
(1993); Les-Bil, Inc. v. General Waterworks Corp., 256 Ark. 905, 511 S.W.2d 166 (1974);
Hancock v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 43 Ark. App. 47, 858 S.W.2d 152 (1993); Moss v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 29 Ark. App. 33, 776 S.W.2d 831 (1989).
32. 256 Ark. 905, 511 S.W.2d 166 (1974).
33. 289 Ark. 550, 713 S.W.2d 462 (1986).
34. 254 Ark. 332, 493 S.W.2d 439 (1973).
35. 25 Ark. App. 279, 757 S.W.2d 182 (1988).





INTERPRETATION BY CONDUCT OF PARTIES
If the language of the contract is ambiguous or uncertain, the
interpretation of it by the parties, as shown by their conduct before any
controversy arose between them, may be considered by you as evidence of
their intent.
COMMENT




CONSTRUCTION AGAINST ONE WHO DRAFTED CONTRACT
Any ambiguous terms of a written contract are to be construed
against the party who drafted it. That is, if there is a reasonable doubt
about the meaning of a provision in a contract, that doubt should be
resolved against the party who prepared the contract.
COMMENT
This instruction states the general rule found in many Arkansas cases.3"
The Committee believes the rule requiring construction against the party who
drafted the contract applies only as to ambiguities in the contract, and has
drafted the instruction accordingly.39 The Committee also notes that this rule
is subordinate to the rule that the factfinder should never adopt a construction
which neutralizes a contract provision when the contract can be construed to
give effect to all of its provisions.40 It is also subordinate to the primary rule
that the intention of the parties be ascertained and effectuated.4' An instruction
stating these superior rules may also be necessary when this model instruction
37. 11 Ark. App. 263, 670 S.W.2d 454 (1984).
38. See, e.g., Schulte v. Benton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 279 Ark. 275, 651 S.W.2d 71 (1983);
Elcare, Inc. v. Gocio, 267 Ark. 605, 593 S.W.2d 159 (1980).
39. Cf Elcare, Inc., 267 Ark. 605, 593 S.W.2d 159 (1980); Barton v. Perryman, 265 Ark.
228, 577 S.W.2d 596 (1979); Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Whitehurst Bros., Inc., 261 Ark. 814, 552
S.W.2d 212 (1977).
40. See North v. Philliber, 269 Ark. 403, 602 S.W.2d 643 (1980); Barrett v. Land Mart
of Am., Inc., 3 Ark. App. 70, 621 S.W.2d 889 (1981).
41. See Harris v. Stephens Prod. Co., 310 Ark. 67, 832 S.W.2d 837 (1992).
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is used. Finally, it may be inappropriate to give this instruction in the situation
where both parties negotiated the written language of the contract.
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FoRM B-6
LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD
BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE
A contract must be construed as a whole: the different clauses of
the contract must be read together and construed so that all of its parts
harmonize, if possible. An interpretation which neutralizes any provision
of a contract cannot be adopted if the contract can be interpreted in a way
that gives effect to all of its provisions.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from the well-established Arkansas rule.42
Where a contract consists of two or more documents, the following alternative
language may be appropriate:
You are instructed that a contract is to be considered as a
whole. If the agreement of the parties is contained in two




SPECIFIC PROVISIONS CONTROL GENERAL PROVISIONS
If, in a contract, there is a contradiction or repugnancy between
general clauses and more detailed, specific clauses, the specific provisions
ordinarily qualify the meaning of the general provisions.
42. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 84 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1996); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989); Gibson v.
Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 202(2) (1981).









WRITTEN OR TYPEWRITTEN PROVISIONS CONTROL PRINTED PROVISIONS
If a contract contains handwritten or typewritten provisions that
are contradictory to typeset provisions, the handwritten or typewritten
provisions control.
COMMENT
See Leonard v. Merchants & Farmers Bank,45 Stacy v. Williams. 6 The
Committee has elected to use the word "typeset" as opposed to "printed" in this
instruction since the word "printed" may have different meanings, including
handwriting which is not cursive.
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-9
TIME NOT EXPRESSED-REASONABLE TIME
When a contract is silent as to when it must be performed, the law
implies that it must be performed within a reasonable time. [In determin-
ing whether the contract was performed within a reasonable time, you should
consider the nature of the contract, the situation of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding the performance.]
44. 461 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1972). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203
(1981).
45. 290 Ark. 571, 720 S.W.2d 908 (1986).




This instruction is based upon Laird v. Lacey,47 Arkansas statutes,4"
and the RESTATEMENT.4 9 The bracketed portion of the instruction may not be
appropriate in every case.
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-10
GENERAL RULE - AMBIGUITY IN TERM [S]
The parties dispute the meaning of [a] certain term[s] in their
contract and you must construe the contract to determine their intention.
In determining the meaning of the term[s], you must take into consider-
ation the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the
subject of the contract, the situation and relation of the parties at the time
the contract was made, customs and usages of trade, the parties' course of
dealing, and the parties' course of performance.
COMMENT
This instruction, derived from Arkansas case law, provides a useful
framework for introducing the instructions which follow."
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-1I
CUSTOM IN THE TRADE
A custom in the trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
47. 263 Ark. 570, 566 S.W.2d 145 (1978).
48. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-204 and 4-2-309(1) (Michie 1991).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, cmt. d (1981).
50. See Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark. 1975);
Stokes v. Roberts, 289 Ark. 319, 711 S.W.2d 757 (1986); Welch v. Cooper, 1 I Ark. App. 263,










A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their
expressions and other conduct.
COMMENT
This instruction is a restatement of title 4, chapter 1, section 205 (1) of




CONSTRUCTION OF ExPREss TERMS, COURSE OF DEALING
AND CUSTOM IN THE TRADE
The express terms of an agreement and any applicable [course of
dealing]/[custom in the trade] as previously defined for you, shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when
such construction is unreasonable, express terms control both course of
dealing and custom in the trade, and course of dealing controls custom in
the trade.
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-205(2) (Michie 1991). The statutes use the phrase "usage
of trade."
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 219-222 (198 1).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-205(1) (Michie 1991).




This instruction is a restatement of title 4, chapter 1, section 205 (4) of
the Arkansas Code.5 5 The instruction is also consistent with Arkansas law as
set forth in the comment to Form B-3.
B. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
FORM B-14
CONTRACT'S IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. The duty is an
implied promise between the parties that they will exercise good faith in
performing their obligations under the contract. Stated another way, the
duty is an implied promise between the parties that they will not do
anything to injure the other party's right to enjoy the benefits of the
contract. However, the duty does not obligate either party to take any
action which is contrary to the express provisions of the contract.
COMMENT
The nature of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in a
contract has not been well-defined by Arkansas courts.5 6 The Committee
believes this instruction to be workable until Arkansas courts give more
guidance as to whether such a duty is implied in every contract and the
significance of such a duty to contract interpretation by a jury. The Committee
urges the members of the bar and bench to carefully review this instruction and
to submit comments concerning its propriety.
The Committee's decision to place this instruction in the chapter
concerning contract interpretation is based upon its belief that the issue of good
faith and fair dealing is first and foremost a rule of contractual interpretation;
that is, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied condition which
relates, at least in part, to the intent of the parties." The issue of whether the
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-205(4) (Michie 1991).
56. Cf. Affiliated Foods Southwest, Inc. v. Moran, 322 Ark. 808, 912 S.W.2d 8 (1995)
(citing ARK CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-203 and 4-1-201). See also TCBY Sys., Inc. v. RSP Co., 33
F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994).
57. See Banco del Estado v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (holding that ."good faith' is simply a rule of contractual interpretation and cannot be
alleged as a separate cause of action from the breach of contract claim."); Bissell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d
780, 789 (2d Cir. 1991): "[a] party's actions may implicate the implied covenant of good faith
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implied condition was performed is dependent upon construction of the
contract in view of parameters established by recent cases. Aside from the first
sentence of this instruction, the instruction simply states those parameters. 8
The second sentence of the instruction is based upon Maryland
National Bank v. Traenkle 9 The third sentence of the instruction is derived
from E.B. Harper & Co. v. Nortek, Inc.60 This same idea is expressed in
slightly different ways in a number of cases.6' The final sentence of the
instruction is based upon a concept expressed in various cases.62
The Committee notes that this instruction may not be adequate to
address the issue of the interplay between the duty of good faith and fair
dealing and a contract provision which allows a party discretion. While this
issue has been broached in at least one case applying Arkansas law,63 it has
been treated more extensively in cases from other jurisdictions.'
C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FORM C-1
EXISTENCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT
As a defense to the plaintiff's action, the defendant claims that his
performance under the agreement was excused because it was conditional
upon [a fact (or) an event] which did not occur. A condition is [a fact] [an
event] the presence or occurrence of which the parties agreed would
extinguish a duty on the part of the defendant. Such a condition is a part
of the contract if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that defendant would not have to
perform a duty or duties under their agreement if or unless [the fact] [the
when it acts so directly to impair the value of the contract for another party that it may be
assumed that they are inconsistent with the intent of the parties.") (emphasis added).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
59. 933 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1996).
60. 104 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1997).
61. See, e.g., Sterling Nat'l Mortgage Co. v. Mortgage Comer, 97 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1996);
Geoffrey E. MacPherson, Ltd. v. Brinecell, Inc., 98 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1996); Greenspan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F.
Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
62. See-Sterling Nat'l Mortgage Co. v. Mortgage Comer, 97 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1996);
Taylor Equip., Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying South Dakota
law and holding that implied covenant does not attach to every term in the contract, or even to
terms which actually appear in the contract, but is to be used to "fill gaps" in the contract) cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1553 (1997); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Traenkle, 933 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md.
1996).
63. See Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. McLean, 938 F. Supp. 487, 493-94 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Barseback Kraft AB v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 691 (1996).
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event] occurred. Such an agreement may be express or may be implied
from the conduct or words of the parties at or before the contract was
entered. Whether the contract was subject to such a condition, and
whether [the fact] [the event] occurred which excused the defendant from
performing his duties is for you to decide on the basis of all the evidence
in the case.
COMMENT
This instruction attempts to state the general rules regarding conditions
precedent in plain language and in light of Stacy v. Williams.65 Stacy may have
laid to rest the familiar rule that contracts will not be interpreted so as to make
their performance conditional. 66
The Arkansas Court of Appeals in Stacy stated that whether a provision
in a contract is a condition depends on the parties' intent, as adduced from the
contract itself.67 If the terms of a writing are ambiguous, extrinsic evidence
may establish intent. Evidence that a contract is delivered conditionally is an
exception to the parol evidence rule.
The propriety of giving this instruction, post-Stacy, may depend on the
trial court's assessment of whether a given promise or writing is ambiguous.
This is a question of law, initially.68 If the trial court finds that the contract is
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence bearing on the parties' intent may be allowed,
and the meaning of the contract will be determined by the jury.69
Stacy is problematic in that contracts frequently contain covenants or
recitals, and to construe them as conditions essentially invites the destruction
of a contract by a party against whom the bargain has turned. That is, the
provision in question-for example, that Buyer will look for financing--may
be a mere recital expressing the fact that Buyer was not looking to Seller to
finance any part of the purchase of the property. It is evident that Buyer made
a bad bargain; the property later sold at a 25% discount from what Buyer
agreed to pay. To what extent do we want contracting parties to make their
performance of bad bargains conditioned on their ability to perform an act of
secondary importance to the agreement? This issue may need further
discussion which could result in the refinement of the present instruction.
65. 38 Ark. App. 192, 834 S.W.2d 156 (1992); See also 17A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts §§
465-474 (1991).
66. Cf. DaCosse v. Ahrens, 2 Ark. App. 61, 616 S.W.2d 777 (1981) (Corbin, J.,
dissenting).
67. See Stacy, 38 Ark. App. 192, 834 S.W.2d 156.
68. See Cate v. Irwin, 44 Ark. App. 39, 866 S.W.2d 423 (1993).
69. See Agey v. Pederson, 191 Ark. 497, 86 S.W.2d 930 (1935).
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C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FORM C-2
FAILURE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT - PERFORMANCE NOT EXCUSED
Performance of duties under a contract will not be excused even
though they are conditional if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(a) that defendant waived the condition; or
(b) that the condition could be fulfilled practicably by defen-
dant; or
(c) that defendant prevented or, without legal excuse, ren-
dered more difficult or expensive, the plaintiff's own
satisfaction of the condition; or
(d) the condition was not such a material part of the contract
that the defendant's assent to the exchange was in fact
dependent upon the fulfillment of the condition.
COMMENT
Subparagraph (a) of this instruction is based upon Hempel v. Bragg.7"
Subsection (b) of the instruction is derived from Betnar v. Rose.71 Subpara-
graph (c) is loosely based upon Royal Manor Apartments v. B.J. Powell
Construction Co.72 and Dickinson v. McKenzie.73 The final subparagraph is
derived from Dongary Holstein Leasing, Inc. v. Covington.74
C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FORM C-3
FRAUD IN INDUCEMENT
As a defense to the plaintiff's action, the defendant states that he
is not liable because his consent to the agreement was induced by fraud.
To establish that the agreement was induced by fraud, the defendant must
70. 313 Ark. 486, 856 S.W.2d 293 (1993).
71. 259 Ark. 820, 536 S.W.2d 719 (1976).
CONTRACTS §§ 230A(2)(b), 245 (1981).
72. 258 Ark. 166, 523 S.W.2d 909 (1975).
73. 197 Ark. 746, 126 SW.2d 95 (1939).
74. 293 Ark. 112, 732 S.W.2d 465 (1987).
CONTRACTS § 229 (1981).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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prove each of the following five elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(a) That the plaintiff made a false representation;
(b) That the plaintiff knew the representation was false;
(c) That the representation was made for the purpose of
inducing the contract;
(d) That the defendant reasonably relied on the representa-
tion; and
(e) That the defendant would not have entered into the
contract except for the false representation.
COMMENT
Fraud may be shown as a defense at law.75 This instruction states the
basic elements for a claim of fraudulent inducement.76 The Committee notes
that this instruction does not address the concept of waiver of the right to assert
fraud as a defense." The instruction also does not address the effect of the
defendant's breach before his discovery of the alleged fraud. However, the
defendant's breach before his discovery of the fraud should not preclude his
assertion of fraud as a defense. 8
C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FoRm C4
UNDUE INFLUENCE
As a defense to the plaintiff's action, the defendant states that his
consent to the agreement was procured by undue influence. Undue
influence is the abuse of a relationship which operates to deprive a party
of his free will and induces him to do that which he otherwise would not
have done.
To sustain this defense, the defendant has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant justifiably reposed
such trust and confidence in the plaintiff that plaintiff's influence
overcame defendant's own free will and that the decision to enter into the
contract was not his free and voluntary act.
75. See Abraham v. Blytheville Indus. Ass'n, 195 Ark. 778, 114 S.W.2d 32 (1938).
76. See, e.g., Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Otto v. Martin Constr. Co., 176 Ark. 448,
460, 3 S.W.2d 310 (1928).
77. See Williams v. City of Midland, 932 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App. 1996); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 380, 381 (1981); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 231 (1991).




The Committee based this instruction on Dent v. Wright79 and
attempted to state the general rule regarding undue influence in understandable
and workable language.80
The editors of AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE note that there is a conflict
as to whether undue influence is a species of constructive fraud or duress."'
However, regardless of its classfication, undue influence appears to be a
defense which may be maintained at law, and not simply in equity.82 No
Arkansas cases appear to have treated the matter.
Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank 3 indicates that when, in an
action at law, the defense is raised the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant entered into the contract voluntarily.' Yet, in an action brought
in equity to cancel a contract for undue influence, the burden is on the party
seeking to cancel the obligation to prove his entitlement, and the evidence must
be clear and convincing. 5 Given that Rule 8(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure lists the issue of "duress" as one which must be raised as an
"affirmative defense," that is, one to be proved by defendant, it is most likely
that our courts would reject Zeigler's analysis in actions at law.
By parity of reasoning, fraud at law is required to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, 6 and in equity by clear and convincing
evidence. 7 Generally speaking, elevated burdens of proof are peculiar to
chancery practice, and foreign to law. Therefore, the Committee used the
preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden of proof for this defense.
79. 322 Ark. 256, 909 S.W.2d 302 (1995).
80. The instruction is also supported by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177
(1981) and 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 237 (1991).
81. See 17A AM.JUR. 2D Contracts § 237 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Brady, 254 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1953);
Zeigler v. Illinois Trust& Sav. Bank, 91 N.E. 1041 (II1. 1910).
83. 91 N.E. 1041 (I1I. 1910).
84. See id.
85. See Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908).
86. See Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993).
87. See Kleiner v. Longrader, 189 Ark. 1171, 75 S.W.2d 1006 (1934).
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C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FORM C-5
DURESS
As a defense to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant states that his
consent to the agreement was procured by duress. To establish this
defense, the defendant must prove the following propositions by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(a) that he involuntarily accepted the terms of the plaintiff;
(b) that at the time he accepted those terms, the circumstances
afforded him no other reasonable alternative than to
accept those terms;
(c) that the circumstances were the result of threats or
coercive acts of the plaintiff; and
(d) defendant renounced the agreement promptly, in consid-
eration of the circumstances, and without accepting its
benefits.
COMMENT
See Cox v. McLaughlin."8 At common law, the defense of duress to
actions at law required a showing of actual imprisonment, or serious threat of
grievous bodily injury sufficient to overbear the will of a man of ordinary
courage. 9 Cox seemingly indicates that contracts may be avoided if one
entered them on threat of serious financial hardship. 90
Cox does not require prompt renunciation as an element of duress, but
the common law did. Likewise, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
requires prompt communication of a party's intention to avoid the contract.91
Therefore, the Committee includes this requirement as an element of the
defense.
88. 315 Ark. 338, 867 S.W.2d 460 (1993).
89. See 2 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 453 (Charles M. Barnes, ed.,
13th ed. 1884).
90. See Cox, 315 Ark. at 345, 867 S.W.2d at 463 (1993) (quoting Totem Marine Tug &
Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline, 584 P.2d 15, 22 (Alaska 1978)).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 381(l) (1981).
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C. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
FORM C-6
WAIVER
As a defense to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant asserts waiver.
Waiver is the voluntary abandonment or surrender by a capable person
of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that he shall forever be
deprived of its benefits. It may occur when one, with full knowledge of
material facts, does something which is inconsistent with the right or his
intention to rely on that right.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon the general rule of waiver announced in
Lester v. Mount Vernon-Enola School District.
92
ENDNOTE TO SECTION C
The Committee has not included an instruction on mutual mistake in
these instructions. Although there is some authority to suggest that the issue
of mutual mistake might be submitted to the jury,93 the Committee believes the
issue of mutual mistake is more properly dealt with in the context of the
equitable remedies of rescission and information. However, the Committee
welcomes comments to the contrary.
D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION D
In preparing the instructions in this section, the Committee considered
it critical to distinguish among the legal theories presented in this section: (1)
cancellation by mutual consent; (2) accord and satisfaction; (3) novation; (4)
modification; and (5) release. A failure to observe the distinction may result
in a multiplicity of instructions on a single basic issue or theory of defense.
This is, at best, undesirable. 94 The following brief discussion sets forth the
distinctions which served to guide the Committee in preparing instructions on
these issues.
92. 323 Ark. 728, 732, 917 S.W.2d 540 (1996).
93. See, e.g., Mitchell v. First Nat'l Bank, 293 Ark. 558, 739 S.W.2d 682 (1987); 4 TEXAS
PATTERN JURY CHARGES, § 101.28 (State Bar of Texas 1990).
94. See, e.g., Hutcheson v. Clapp, 216 Ark. 517, 226 S.W.2d 546 (1950); Furlow v.
United Oil Mills, 104 Ark. 489, 149 S.W. 69 (1912).
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Taking the easiest case first, the defense of release requires a writing.95
Once the writing is proved, it must be supported by consideration. A total
failure of consideration will void the release,% but a partial failure of consider-
ation only gives rise to an action for the balance owed.97
An accord and satisfaction, under the strict common law, may not arise
until there has been a breach of covenant by one of the parties.9s An "accord"
reached before a breach would be, at common law, an "equitable defense," but
not a defense cognizable at law. This distinction was described by Judge
Tucker as "technical" in nature, and probably does not apply today for that
reason.
Accord and satisfaction is a defense at law.99 It may be oral.'00 It has
two parts, both of which must be proved: an accord, meaning an agreement to
accept a different consideration in satisfaction of the original obligation; and
a satisfaction, consisting of the acceptance of the substituted consideration.°O'
Accord and satisfaction is a defense if tender is accepted as such, but not
otherwise. 0 2 Performance or execution of the accord is necessary; part
performance does not constitute satisfaction. 0 3 This is distinct from release
(which must be written) in that an unexecuted accord is no satisfaction at all;
a partially paid release gives the releasor only a claim for the balance of the
consideration, and not an action on his original claim.
Accord and satisfaction differs from a compromise and settlement,
which may be enforced even if tender of performance is not accepted.
Furthermore, compromise and settlement bars claims that are disputed and
unliquidated; whereas an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in bar to any
claim.
Rescission by mutual agreement differs from accord and satisfaction
in several particulars. First, strictly speaking, an accord and satisfaction looks
toward a contract that is performed by one party, and executory in the other.
95. See Swan v. Benson, 31 Ark. 728 (1877). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 284 and cmt. a (1981).
96. See Golf Shaft & Block Co. v. O'Keefe, 200 Ark. 529, 139 S.W.2d 691 (1940).
97. See White v. General Motors Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd, 908 F.2d
669 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
98. See 2 HENRY ST. G. TUCKER, COMMENTARY ON LAWS OF VIRGINIA 24 (1831).
99. See Johnson v. Aylor, 129 Ark. 82, 195 S.W. 4 (1917).
100. See Arkansas Valley Feed Mills, Inc. v. Fox De Luxe Foods, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 145
(W.D Ark. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1960).
101. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Polar Express, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Ark.
1991).
102. See Kelley v. Wiggins, 291 Ark. 280, 724 S.W.2d 443 (1987).
103. See In re McMullan, 196 B.R. 818 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996); General Air
Conditioning Corp. v. Fullerton, 227 Ark. 278, 298 S.W.2d 61 (1957); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981).
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A rescission by mutual agreement occurs when the contract, to some extent, is
executory in both parties.' °4 The rescission occurs when the parties agree to
"walk away from the deal." If such an agreement is made, it requires no
separate consideration because the release by A of the performance executory
in B is consideration for the release by B of the performance executory in A.'0 5
Novation is a species of accord and satisfaction. 0 6 A novation is a
contract consisting of two stipulations: first to extinguish an existing
obligation; second to substitute a new one in place of the original.° 7 An accord
and satisfaction relates solely to the extinguishment of a debt or obligation. An
accord must be satisfied, or it is ineffective as such.'08 A novation need not be
executed. Thus, where a promise is exchanged, and not a performance, the
parties have entered a novation; where performance is demanded alone, an
accord and satisfaction.'°9
With the foregoing in mind, we submit the following instructions.
D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
FORM D-1
RECISSION BY MUTUAL CONSENT
As a defense to plaintiff's claim, the defendant states that the
parties agreed to rescind their obligations under their contract.
The parties to a contract that has not been fully performed by
either one may agree to cancel their contract. If they do, the contract is at
an end, and no party to it may thereafter sue on it. An agreement to
cancel a contract may be oral or written, express or implied, but all parties
must consent to it. A mutual agreement to rescind a contract that has not
yet been fully performed by either side needs no new or independent
consideration. The party claiming that a contract has been rescinded must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he and all other parties to
the contract agreed to rescind or cancel it.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 283, cmt. a (1981).
105. For an illustration of these general propositions, see Arkansas Valley Feed Mills v. Fox
De Luxe Foods, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
106. See Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 556 P.2d 67, 69 (Idaho 1976).
107. See Wheeler v. Wardell, 3 S.E.2d 377 (1939); compare In re Sanders, 75 B.R. 746
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); Alston v. Bitely, 252 Ark. 79, 477 S.W.2d 446 (1972), and
McIllwain v. Bank of Harrisburg, 18 Ark. App. 213, 713 S.W.2d 469 (1986).
108. See In re McMullan, 196 B.R. 818 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996).




See Morgan v. Shackleford" 0 and Leonard v. Downing.'
D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
FORM D-2
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
An accord and satisfaction is an agreement by one party to a
contract that he will accept from the other a different performance from
the one demanded in the original contract, followed by the actual
performance of the substituted obligation. An accord and satisfaction, in
other words, is a new contract, the performance of which discharges the
rights and obligations created by a previous contract.
There can be no accord and satisfaction unless both parties
understood or should have understood as reasonable parties that by
accepting the terms of the new agreement, their rights and obligations
under the previous contract would be cancelled.
Defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, both the new agreement, and his actual performance of it.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Arkansas case law and the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS." 2 In an appropriate case, the instruction may
need to be expanded to cover the situations envisioned by the drafters of
subsections (2) and (3) of the RESTATEMENT.
110. 174 Ark. 337, 295 S.W. 46(1927).
111. 246 Ark. 397, 438 S.W.2d 327 (1969).
112. See In re McMullan, 196 B.R. 818 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996); Employees Ins. of
Wausau v. Polar Express, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Holland v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank, 18 Ark. App. 119, 711 S.W.2d 481 (1986). The instruction is also consistent
with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981), but does not go as far as
subsections (2) or (3) of § 281.
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D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
FORM D-3
RELEASE
A release is an agreement, in writing, that in return for valid
consideration, a person having a claim or right against another surrenders
it. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff agreed in writing to release his claim against the
defendant, for a valuable consideration.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Arkansas case law and is consistent in
substance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS." 3
D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
FORM D-4
MODIFICATION
A contract may be modified or changed by a later oral or written
agreement which meets each of the elements of a valid contract. Whether
or not the parties to this action have modified the original contract is for
you to determine.
COMMENT
This instruction states the rule found in Arkansas case law." 4 When
the alleged modification is oral, the instruction should also state that the party
alleging the modification has the burden of proving the modification by clear
and convincing evidence." 5
Modification of a portion of a contract should be distinguished from
a novation which is treated in the following instruction.
113. See Green v. Owens, 254 Ark. 574, 495 S.W.2d 166 (1973); Skinner v. Fisher, 120
Ark. 91, 178 S.W. 922 (1915); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284 (1981).
114. See In re Honeycutt, 198 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996); Leonard v. Downing, 246
Ark. 397,438 S.W.2d 327 (1969); Linda Elenia Askew Trust v. Hopkins, 15 Ark. App. 19, 688
S.W.2d 316 (1985).
115. See Amerdyne Indus., Inc. v. POM, Inc., 760 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985); Columbia Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ingraham, 47 Ark. App. 23, 883 S.W.2d 868 (1994), rev'd on other grounds,
320 Ark. 408, 896 S.W.2d 903 (1995).
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D. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT
FORM D-5
NOVATION
Parties to a contract may substitute a new agreement for all or
part of an existing contract that has not been performed. This is known
as a novation. The evidence must show that the parties intended to
extinguish the old contract and rely entirely on the new one. The party
claiming a novation has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(1) the original contract was valid; and
(2) all parties consented to the extinguishment of the original
contract, and to the substitution of a new performance;
and
(3) there was a sufficient consideration [which may consist of
the expenses incurred by one party in preparation to
perform the substituted duty]; and
(4) the new contract is valid.
COMMENT
See JI. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Road Improvement District
No. 3; 116 Alston v. Bitely;"7 Boshart v. Gardner;" Elkins v. Henry Vogt
Machine Co. "9
E. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM E-1
ACTUAL AND ANTICIPATORY BREACH
Unless performance by a party is excused, the failure to perform
the contract at the time performance is due is an actual breach. Defective
performance also constitutes an actual breach unless justified.
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party repudiates the
contract before performance is due. Repudiation may consist of a
statement reasonably interpreted to mean that the party will not or cannot
perform the contract. It may also consist of a voluntary affirmative act
which renders the party unable to perform.
116. 210F. 366(E.D. Ark. 1914).
117. 252 Ark. 79, 477 S.W.2d 446 (1972).




When an anticipatory breach occurs, the injured party may sue
for breach immediately or he may wait to sue until performance is due.
COMMENT
This instruction follows the holdings in Cox v. McLaughlin;2 ° Jim Orr
& Assocs., Inc. v. Waters;'2' Stocker v. Hall;22 De Lukie v. American
Petroleum Co. ;123 Bank of Cabot v. Bledsoe. 1
24
E. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM E-2
BREACH
The nonperformance of a contractual duty is a breach of the
contract. [A material breach is a failure to perform an essential term or
condition which substantially defeats the purpose of the contract for the other
party.]
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Zufari v. Architecture Plus'2 and TXO
Production Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc. 126 The Committee drafted the definition
of a material breach from various sources with the intention of making it easy
for the jury to use. Use the bracketed portion when there is an issue as to
whether the breach was material or minor.
E. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM E-3
TOTAL OR PARTIAL BREACH
The breach of a contract may be total or partial. If the breach of
the contract is material, the breach is total. A total breach excuses the
performance of the other party and allows that party to sue for damages
120. 315 Ark. 338, 867 S.W.2d 460 (1993).
121. 299 Ark. 526, 530-31, 773 S.W.2d 99, 102 (1989).
122. 269 Ark. 468, 472-73, 602 S.W.2d 662 (1980).
123. 170 Ark. 453, 461, 280 S.W. 669 (1926).
124. 9 Ark. App. 145, 148-49, 653 S.W.2d 144 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) & cmt. b and § 250 (1981).
125. 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).
126. 287 Ark. 304, 698 S.W.2d 791 (1985). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
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as to the whole contract. A breach which is not material is a partial
breach. A partial breach does not excuse the performance of the other
party but does allow the party to seek damages for the partial breach.
COMMENT
This instruction follows TXO Production Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc.127
E. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM E-4
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
The doctrine of substantial performance permits a party to recover
in spite of his own breach of the contract if performance is sufficiently
substantial. The [plaintiff] [defendant] alleges that he substantially
performed his contract with the [plaintiff][defendant.] Whether the
contract was substantially performed is for you to determine.
Substantial performance cannot be determined by a mathematical
rule relating to the percentage of the cost of completion. In determining
whether performance was substantial, you should consider the following
factors:
(a) the extent to which the other party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the other party can be adequately
compensated for the benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party asserting substantial perfor-
mance will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party asserting substantial perfor-
mance will cure his failure, taking into account all circum-
stances, including any reasonable assurance; and
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party asserting
substantial performance comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.
127. 287 Ark. 304, 307, 698 S.W.2d 791, 793 (1985). Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Storms Agri




The Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of substantial
performance applies to contracts of all kinds. 28 The Committee prepared this
instruction to comport with Stratton and Roberts & Co. v. Sergio. 129 The
instruction may be used in conjunction with a complaint or a counterclaim.
E. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM E-5
TENDER
Tender consists of a party's timely and good faith offer to perform
under the contract and a present ability to immediately perform. To be
effective, the tender must be made in accordance with the terms of the
contract and on or before the time the performance of the party making
the tender is due. In addition, the tender must be communicated to the
other party. [If the parties' contract does not specify a time for performance,
the tender must be made within a reasonable time.] [If the parties' contract does
not specify the place of performance, the tender must be made in some
convenient place subject to the disposal of the other party, and the party
making the tender must notify the other party of the place of tender.]
COMMENT
The Committee believes the concept of a tender involves both
questions of law and of fact. For example, the trial court must first determine
when tender is required. Tender is not required when tender would be a vain
and useless effort.'30 Thus, tender would not be required where the other party
has prevented performance, where the other party is incapable of performing
or where tender has been made impossible. 131
The primary issue of fact for the jury appears to be only whether any
required tender was effectively made. Therefore, the Committee has drafted
the instruction to deal only with that issue.
32
128. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Stratton, 14 Ark. App. 145, 685 S.W.2d 818
(1985).
129. 22 Ark. App. 58, 733 S.W.2d 420 (1987).
130. See, e.g., Loveless v. Diehl, 235 Ark. 805, 364 S.W.2d 317 (1962).
131. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 614 (1991).
132. The instruction is based upon Telcoe Credit Union v. Eackles, 293 Ark. 149, 151, 732
S.W.2d 477,478 (1987); Loveless v. Diehl, 235 Ark. 805, 364 S.W.2d 317 (1962), and 17A
AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 615 (1991).
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The bracketed portions of the instruction should be used when
appropriate. The more complicated questions relate to the waiver of the tender
requirement and the waiver of a defective tender. These special situations
should be handled with other instructions.
F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-1
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
As a defense to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant asserts that
performance of the contract was impossible. In order to establish the
defense of impossibility of performance, the defendant must prove each of
the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that the defendant diligently attempted to perform
his duty under the contract; and
Second, that performance by the defendant became
impossible as a result of [describe the event on which the defendant
relies, e.g., Act of God, change of law, death of essential party].
COMMENT
The Committee based this instruction on Frigillana v. Frigillana'33 and
Christy v. Pilkinton. 3 4 Christy distinguishes between objective impossibil-
ity-the thing cannot be done-and subjective impossibility-I cannot do it. 35
The Committee has not made this distinction in the proposed instruction,
leaving it to the trial court to discern the difference between objective and
subjective impossibility and to refuse to submit this instruction if there is
insufficient evidence to establish a question of fact as to whether performance
was objectively impossible.
133. 266 Ark. 296, 302-03, 584 S.W.2d 30, 33 (1979).
134. 224 Ark. 407, 273 S.W.2d 533 (1954).
135. See id. Judge George Rose Smith discussed the distinction as follows: "The latter
which is well illustrated by a promisor's financial inability to pay, does not discharge the
contractual duty ..... Id. at 533.
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F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-2
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH
If the plaintiff commits a material breach of the parties' contract
before the breach of the defendant, the defendant's obligation to perform
is discharged. If, however, the plaintiff's breach is minor, the defendant's
obligation to perform under the contract is not discharged.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Dongary Holstein Leasing, Inc. v.
Covington.136 The instruction should be used when there is an issue as to
whether the plaintiff committed a prior material breach which excused the
defendant's performance under the contract.
F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-3
FIRST BREACH
The party who first breaches the contract cannot enforce the
contract against the other party who later breaches the contract, and the
other party's obligation to perform under the contract is discharged.
However, a minor and insubstantial breach does not discharge the other
party's obligation to perform. Whether the first breach was material or
minor is for you to decide based upon the evidence presented to you.
COMMENT
This instruction should be used when there is an issue as to whether
one party's prior breach excused the performance of the other party. The
Committee based this instruction on TXO Production Corp. v. Page Farms,
Inc. 137 The instruction states the general rule regarding the first breach whereas
the previous instruction tailors the first breach rule to a breach by the plaintiff.
This instruction is offered for use when there is a complaint and counterclaim
alleging breach of contract.
The Committee notes that TXO Production Corp. recognizes that a
minor first breach may provide the other party a remedy in the form of
136. 293 Ark. 112, 732 S.W.2d 465 (1987).
137. 287 Ark. 304, 698 S.W.2d 791 (1985).
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damages for a partial breach. 31 If the facts of a particular case permit a claim
for partial breach, the Committee refers the reader to the instruction relating to
total and partial breach. See Form E-3.
F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-4
DEATH OR DISABLING ILLNESS
If a party contracts to perform a service that is purely personal,
then the death or disabling illness of that party will excuse his perfor-
mance.
[If the parties' contract contains [a] separate agreement[s] that [is][are]
not purely personal, and the agreement[s] pertaining to non-personal matters
can be severed from the agreement relating to purely personal service, then the
agreement[s] relating to non-personal matters may still be enforced.]
COMMENT
This instruction incorporates the holdings in Mullen v. Wager 3 9 and
Collins v. Woodruff')4 We note that the instruction does not address the
situation in which a disabling illness is not permanent in nature. In that
situation, and one in which the time for performance might be extended, this
instruction may not be appropriate. The bracketed portion should be used
when appropriate.
F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-5
PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE
The failure of a party to perform a contract is excused when that
party's performance is prevented or substantially hindered by the conduct
of the other party.
138. See id. at 307, 698 S.W.2d at 793 (quoting CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1253 (1962)).
139. 252 Ark. 541,544-45,480 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1972).




The Committee prepared this instruction from Royal Manor Apart-
ments v. Powell Construction Co.,14' Harris v. Holder, 142 and Dickinson v.
McKenzie.1
43
F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-6
WAIVER OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
As a defense to the plaintiff's claim of breach of contract, the
defendant asserts that the plaintiff waived any breach. In order to
establish the defense of waiver, the defendant must prove each of the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that the plaintiff had knowledge of the breach by the
defendant;
Second, that the plaintiff continued to accept benefits
under the contract; and
Third, that the defendant continued to perform under the
contract as a result of the plaintiff's continued acceptance of
benefits.
COMMENT
This instruction follows Renfro v. Swift Eckrich, Inc.;'" Grady-Gould
Watershed Improvement District v. Transamerica Insurance Co.;145 and
Stephens v. West Pontiac-GMC, Inc. " The Committee notes that the interplay
between the alleged fraudulent concealment of a breach and the knowledge
element of a waiver claim was treated in Renfro v. Swift Eckrich, Inc. 47 The
Committee also notes that this instruction is not adequate to address any waiver
other than the waiver of a breach. Other instances of waiver (e.g., an allegation
that the requirement of tender was waived) may be addressed with Form C-6.
141. 258 Ark. 166, 523 S.W.2d 909 (1975).
142. 217 Ark. 434, 230 S.W.2d 645 (1950).
143. 197 Ark. 746, 126 S.W.2d 95 (1939).
144. 53 F.3d 1460 (8th Cir. 1995).
145. 570 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1978).
146. 7 Ark. App. 275, 647 S.W.2d 492 (1983).
147. 53 F.3d 1460 (8th Cir. 1995).
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F. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE OR BREACH
FORM F-7
ESTOPPEL
The plaintiff may not recover damages for breach of contract by
the defendant if the affirmative defense of estoppel is proved. In order to
prove the defense of estoppel, the defendant must prove each of the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) The plaintiff knew the material facts and circumstances
surrounding the alleged breach;
(2) By his words, conduct or silence the plaintiff led the
defendant to believe he was excusing the breach;
(3) The plaintiff intended that the defendant would act upon
his words, conduct or silence; and
(4) The defendant relied upon the words, conduct or silence
of the plaintiff to his detriment.
COMMENT
This instruction restates the holding in State Farm MutualAutomobile




DAMAGES - GENERAL RULE
If you find in favor of the plaintiff, you must then decide how
much money, if any, would fairly compensate the plaintiff for the
defendant's failure to keep his promise. In order to fairly compensate the
plaintiff, your award should put the plaintiff in the same position that the
plaintiff would have been in if the defendant had kept his promise. The
plaintiff is not entitled to be placed in a better position than he would have
been placed had the breach not occurred.
If you find that actual damages have been proved by the plaintiff,
you shall award as such actual damages:
[Insert the proper measure of general damages for the type of contract
involved.]
148. 48 Ark. App. 136, 144, 892 S.W.2d 519, 523 (1995).
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A defendant may not be held liable for special damages unless the
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) The defendant knew his breach would result in special
damages to the plaintiff; and
(2) The defendant tacitly agreed to assume responsibility for
the special damages.
If you find that the foregoing elements have been proved by the
plaintiff, you shall award as such special damages:
[Insert the proper measure of special damages, if appropriate.]
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Arkansas case law, 149 Alaska and
Colorado jury instructions.' ° The Committee's intent was to incorporate
Arkansas law, including the tacit agreement rule, 5' into one useful format. An
informative example of the various measures of general damages is found in
North Carolina jury instructions.'52
G. DAMAGES
FORM G-2
DAMAGES - PARTIAL PERFORMANCE
When a contract has been partially performed but all of the
important parts of the contract have not been performed, the complaining
party cannot recover for the partial performance of the contract if his
failure to perform the balance of the contract is not excused. However, he
may recover for partial performance if the contract so provides. If a party
is entitled to recover for partial performance, either because his other
performance was excused or because the contract so provided, he may
recover the value of the benefit of his partial performance.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Lynch v. Stephens.'53
149. See, e.g., HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES, § 17-1 (3d ed. 1996).
150. ALASKA PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 24.09A (Alaska Bar Assn. 1994);
COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 30.35 (Bancroft-Whitney, 3d ed. 1990).
151. See Morrow v. First Nat'l Bank, 261 Ark. 568, 550 S.W.2d 429 (1977).
152. See NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES, § 517.10 (N.C.
Conference of Super. Ct. Judges 1984).






DAMAGES - SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
When a party has substantially performed a contract, he may
recover the contract price less the reasonable costs of completing the
contract [and the reasonable costs of remedying any defects].
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Prudential Insurance Co. v. Stratton.54




DAMAGES - PERFORMANCE EXCUSED
When a person contracts for the performance of services by that
person for a stipulated period of time and is then prevented from
completing the contract in full by [specify an excuse recognized by law],
then he may recover reasonable compensation for the service actually
rendered.
COMMENT
See Lynch v. Stephens.155 Excuses recognized by law might include




DAMAGES - LOST PROFITS
In order to prove that he has suffered lost profits, the plaintiff
must present evidence that provides you with a reasonable basis for
determining the amount of the lost profits in money. Lost profits cannot
be awarded as an element of the plaintiffs damages if the evidence
154. 14 Ark. App. 145, 685 S.W.2d 818 (1985).
155. 179 Ark. 118, 14 S.W.2d 257 (1929).
156. See Form F-4, comment.
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presented in support of the claim requires you to speculate as to the
amount of lost profits.
COMMENT
This instruction should be used in conjunction with Form G-1 because




If you are required to assess damages and if you also find that the
parties' contract provided for an agreed amount to be paid to the plaintiff
in the event of the defendant's breach, then you must award the plaintiff
as damages the amount agreed upon.
COMMENT
In presenting this instruction, the Committee envisions that arguments
concerning the unconscionability or unreasonableness of provisions relating to
limitation of remedies or damages will have been addressed and resolved by
the Court to the extent such an issue involves at least mixed questions of law
and fact.'58 If a liquidated damage clause presents certain fact issues, this
instruction should be modified. For example, the plaintiff may argue that a
sentence should be added to this instruction as follows:
However, you are not required to award the amount of
damages agreed upon if you find that [insert elements relating
to failure of essential purpose or unconscionability]. 59
The defendant may ask for a modification which states as follows:
However, you are not required to award the amount of
damages agreed upon if the amount is so disproportionate to
the actual amount of damage actually sustained that it would
157. See HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 4-6 (3d ed. 1996) and the
cases cited therein.
158. See, e.g., CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136 (1992).




constitute a penalty against the defendant. In that event, you
should award the actual damages that you find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence were sustained by the plaintiff.'60
G. DAMAGES
FORM G-7
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL - RELIANCE DAMAGES
If you find that the plaintiff has proved an enforceable promise by
the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, you must then decide
how much money, if any, to award the plaintiff as restitution damages. To
calculate the plaintiff's restitution damages, you must determine the value
of any [benefit that the plaintiff conferred] [detriment that the plaintiff incurred]
in reliance on the defendant's promise then subtract any cost, expense or
loss that you find the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been
performed.
COMMENT
This instruction was derived from Alaska and Utah jury instructions.
16'
Although there appears to be some confusion in Arkansas law as to the
measure of damages on a claim for promissory estoppel, the instruction appears
to be consistent with Arkansas case law. 162 This instruction should be used in




A party must use reasonable care, effort or expenditure in
minimizing, or mitigating, his damages, and may not recover for any
damage that you find he reasonably could have avoided. The burden of
proof on this issue is on the party asserting that damages could have been
mitigated. If you find that a party has failed to mitigate damages, you
160. Cf Associated Press v. Southern Ark. Radio Co., 34 Ark. App. 211, 809 S.W.2d 695
(1991).
161. ALASKA PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 24.12A; MODEL UTAH JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 26.49 (Michie 1993).
162. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583,374 S.W.2d 818 (1964);
Hoffius v. Maestri, 31 Ark. App. 13, 786 S.W.2d 846 (1990); Country Comer Food & Drug,
Inc. v. Reiss, 22 Ark. App. 222, 737 S.W.2d 672 (1987).
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must subtract from any damages you award the amount that could have
been avoided with reasonable care, effort or expenditure.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon Western Grove School District v.
Strain.63 The instruction states the general rule of mitigation of damages.
163. 288 Ark. 507, 707 S.W.2d 306 (1986).
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